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Abstract
This paper concerns regulations of hazardous economic activities.
Economists have generally viewed ex ante regulations (safety standards,
Pigouvian fees) that regulate an activity before an accident occurs as
substitutes for ex post policies (eg. , exposure to test liability) for
correcting externalities.
This paper shows that under uncertainty there are inefficiencies
associated with the use of negligence liability. We also show that an ex
ante safety standard can correct the inefficiencies associated with
liability. In such a case, where both ex ante and ex post policies are
used, it is efficient to set the safety standard below the level of
precaution that would be called for if the standard were used alone.

I. INTRODUCTION
One of the main issues that dominates the economic literature on
optimal regulation is the choice of the most efficient policy for
correcting an externality. From its beginnings the literature has
focused on alternative forms of what may be called ex ante policies
(e.g., safety standards, Pigouvian taxes, and transferable discharge
permits) that affect an activity before the externality is generated.
But in the past decade researchers have analyzed the ability of what
may be called ex post policies (e.g., exposure to tort liability) to
control externalities. These latter policies regulate the exter-
nality only after it has been generated and harm has occurred. The
threat of suit causes the potential injurer to internalize the ex-
pected social damages and thus to take optimal precaution.
Economists have generally viewed _ex ante and _ex post policies as
substitutes for correcting externalities. The usual policy recom-
mendation has been to choose the less costly regulatory policy to
administer. For instance, in the commonly cited case of chopping down
a tree in one's yard, it is less costly to use threat of suit to force
appropriate caution than to construct a myriad of permits and regula-
tions covering tree-felling. An example at the other extreme is air
pollution where it is less costly to promulgate well thought out regu-
lations than to let each potential injured party take injurers to
court. Rarely is the joint use of j2x ante and _ex post policies recora-
2
mended for a given externality.
This conclusion, however, stands in stark contrast to actual
policy. One of the most noticeable features of current policy dealing
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with externality-generating activities in a wide number of areas is
that _ex ante and e_x post policies are very frequently used jointly.
Consider the following examples. The potential inefficiencies of in-
compatible neighboring property uses—e.g., a hospital located next
to a noisy, dusty cement-manufacturing plant—are minimized by zoning
ordinances (a form of ^x ante regulation) and by simultaneously
exposing the externality-generator to nuisance liability (a form of ex
3
post regulation). Similarly, society attempts to minimize the harms
that new pharmaceuticals may inflict on users by requiring the manu-
facturers of drugs to engage in specific tests before the drugs are
licensed by the federal Food and Drug Administration for prescription
and sale (a form of ex ante regulation) and also by thereafter
exposing the drug manufacturers to strict products liability (ex post
regulation). In the field of environmental externalities, the poten-
tial harms of toxic wastes are regulated at the federal level by the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (1982), which imposes ex ante
siting and technological regulations on the generation and disposal of
hazardous wastes, and the Comprehensive Environmental Resource,
Compensation, and Liability Act (1979), which establishes ex post
liability rules for the recovery of compensatory and punitive damages
for harms imposed by hazardous wastes.
This phenomenon of complementary use of j2_x ante and ex post regu-
latory policies is so widespread that the dearth of persuasive theore-
tical arguments for this joint use is glaring. Various authors have
identified inefficiencies associated with one or the other regulatory
policy. In the case of ex ante regulation, the typical criticism is
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that the central regulator has imperfect information on accident costs
and damages (Weitzman, 1974; Baumol and Oates, 1971; Rose-Ackerraan,
1973; Shavell, 1984b), which leads to inefficient under-control of
some wrongdoers and overcontrol of others. The typical criticisms of
tort liability have been that suit may not always be brought against
injurers, that bankruptcy provides an incentive for underprotection,
and that uncertainty regarding the legal standard leads to over- or
under-protection, depending on the circumstances (Brown, 1973; Cooter
et al , 1979; Craswell and Calfee, 1986; Shavell, 1984b; Wittman,
1977). Shavell (1984b) appears to be alone in suggesting that ex ante
and e>c post regulation can complement one another in that their joint
use can be preferred to using either alone to correct an externality.
This paper builds on two strands of the literature. We first
identify a set of inefficiencies associated with ex post liability.
These inefficiencies are due to a potential injurer's being uncertain
about whether or not a court will hold him liable in the event of an
accident and suit. Our discussion formalizes and extends the results
and conjectures of Craswell and Calfee (1985) and Calfee and Craswell
(1984). In contrast to Shavell (1984b), we do not base our analysis
upon the inefficiencies due to bankruptcy and uncertainty of suit.
Having identified inefficiencies associated with tort liability, we
then demonstrate how e_x ante regulation, if used jointly with tort
liability, can correct some of those inefficiencies.
One of our strongest conclusions, and a startling one, is that
when ex ante and ex post policies should be used jointly, efficiency
generally requires that the ex ante regulatory standard be set at a
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level that, if regulation were used alone, would provide a socially
suboptimal level of safety or precaution. Put somewhat differently to
emphasize this unconventional conclusion, when tort liability rules
are in place, it is inefficient to set ex ante regulatory standards at
the socially optimal level where marginal costs of precaution equal
the marginal benefits. The only instances when the ^x ante regulatory
standard should be set at the social optimum are when there is no ex
post liability or, equivalently , when there is a zero probability of a
judgment under ex post liability. A final, concluding section ela-
borates on the policy implications of the model and suggests some
extensions of the analysis for future research.
II. A MODEL OF NEGLIGENCE AND SAFETY REGULATION
Consider the case in which a risk-neutral firm (or any other eco-
nomic agent) engages in a risky activity. As a result of that activ-
ity, accidents can occur. The firm can reduce the dangers associated
with this activity by taking precaution. Precaution reduces expected
accident costs but is costly to the firm.
Let x be the level of the firm's precaution in preventing an acci-
dent or reducing its severity. For simplicity, we will not consider
the decisions of the potential victim by assuming she always takes the
4
socially optimal level of precaution. The injuring firm s costs of
taking precaution are given by the function C(x), which is upward
sloping [C'(x) > 0] and convex over the relevant region. An accident
will occur with probability p(x,e) and will be of size (cost) D(x,e)
where e is a random variable representing the state-of-the-world and
-5-
distributed with density function q . Assume the expected value of e
e
is zero. Define A(x) as the expected value of p(x,e)D(x,e) over e.
Thus, A(x) embodies both the accident size (D) and the probability of
the accident occurring (p). The state-of-the-world is only revealed
after a court has heard evidence after an accident has occurred.
Assume A(x) is convex and downward sloping over the relevant region
[A'(x) < 0]. Assume that [C(x) + A(x)] is strictly convex.
To avoid confusion, it is useful to preview the three fundamen-
tally different levels of precaution we will consider. We first
define the socially optimal amount of precaution, x*, where the
expected social costs of accidents are minimized. We then define the
legal standard of care, x(e), the court's interpretation of the social
optimum, which is a function of e since it is only revealed after an
accident occurs. The third type of precaution is the firm's pre-
caution level, x, chosen to minimize expected private costs to the
firm. Our goal will be to compare x and x*.
The socially optimal amount of precaution for the potential
injurer can be obtained by minimizing expected social costs, i.e.,
min E [C(x) + p(x,e)D(x, e) ] = min[C(x) + A(x)]. (1)
x x
At the unique level of x that minimizes Eqn. (1), x*, the marginal
cost of precaution equals the negative of the marginal expected cost
of the accident, i.e.,
C'(x*) = -A'(x*), (2)
assuming the solution of Eqn. 1 is greater than zero.
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The legal standard, as opposed to the social optimum, is an ex
post parameter, revealed by the courts after an accident has occurred.
Thus the legal standard is parameterized by the state-of-the-world:
x(e). In fact x(e) is defined as the solution of
min[C(x) + p(x,e)D(x,e)] (3)
x
for which the first-order condition is
C'(x) + d[p(x, e )D(x, e )] . (4)
ax
assuming an interior maximum. Eqn. 4 implicitly defines x(e). Since
e is a random variable, x(e) induces a distribution on x, which we
terra q_ or more simply, q. Clearly E(x) = x*. Although in our model
uncertainty in x is induced by uncertainty in accident costs, other
authors have posited other reasons for uncertainty in x. The impor-
tant point is that x is not known with certainty by the firm. It is
at this point that the notion of liability enters. Under a negligence
rule, the injurer is found liable for all damages if, and only if, his
6
level of precaution was less than the legal standard of precaution.
Mathematically, the insurer's total expected costs are given by
TC(x) = E [C(x) + L(x,e)p(x,e)D(x,e)] (5)
where L(x,e), the liability rule, is defined by
1 if x < x(e)
Negligence: L(x,e) = { (6)
otherwise
-7-
Let x be the level of precaution that minimizes (5). Ideally, x
should equal x* in which case the liability rule is ex ante efficient.
A basic result of Brown (1973) is that when the legal standard is
defined as in (4), and the firm knows that standard with certainty (e
fixed), then the negligence rule is efficient. This conclusion in the
case of negligence is qualified by Calfee and Craswell (1984). Their
argument hinges on ^x ante uncertainty on the part of the firm,
regarding the legal standard, x(e). They point out that at the opti-
mal level of care, the marginal costs of precaution just offset the
marginal accident costs from precaution. But the injurer also sees a
marginal savings in liability due to the unpredictability of the legal
standard. Thus, the potential injurer may take precaution x * E(x(e))
= x*. Unfortunately, for the most part Calfee and Craswell are unable
to prove their conjectures and must rely on cogent argument and
numerical examples. Furthermore, their argument that liability may
have inefficiencies leaves the door open for correcting some of that
inefficiency with simultaneous ^x ante regulation.
Shavell (1984b) provides the only thorough treatment of correcting
inefficiencies of tort liability by supplementing it with ^x ante
safety regulation. Instead of relying on uncertainty, Shavell argues
that negligence is inefficient because L(x) < 1. And this, he
suggests, is due to a) a positive probability that suit will never be
brought against an injurer; and b) because assets of the injurer are
less than potential accident costs (D). For symmetry, Shavell also
suggests that ^x ante regulation by itself is inefficient because D is
not known with certainty to the regulator (but is known by the firm).
The results of these conditions are shown in Figure 1. For a given
accident size, first best precaution will always exceed precaution
induced by liability since there is a positive probability of never
being sued, even if an accident occurs (L(x) < 1). Furthermore, the
firm need not plan for accidents whose damage exceeds the assets of
the firm. In contrast, pure ex ante regulation requires one level of
care for all firms. This means that firms that cause small accidents
are over-regulated and firms that cause large accidents are under-
regulated. A mixed regulatory system results in firms that cause
little damage being regulated by the ex ante regulation and firms that
cause great damage being regulated by the threat of liability. Given
the inefficiencies built into ex ante safety regulation and ex post
liability for harm, it is easy to show that a hybrid does no worse and
frequently does better than either approach alone. This result is
strikingly similar to that of Roberts and Spence (1976). They argue,
in an entirely different context, for a hybrid system of price and
quantity controls to optimally control an externality. The analogy
to our problem is that quantity controls are akin to ex ante regula-
tions and price controls are similar to tort liability (in that liabi-
lity induces the firm to minimize marginal damage and marginal
precaution costs).
The difficulty with the Shavell analysis is that it hinges on L(x)
being strictly less than 1. If bankruptcy is not a possibility and
suit is never brought, then L(x) = 1 and there are no inefficiencies
associated with liability.
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We take a different approach in this paper. Similar to Craswell
and Calfee (1986) we suggest that it is uncertainty over the legal
standard that leads to inefficiencies with negligence. In fact in the
next section we prove all of their conjectures as well as others re-
garding the efficiency of negligence liability. In the subsequent
section of the paper we introduce ^x ante regulation as a means of
correcting some of these inefficiencies.
III. THE INEFFICIENCY OF NEGLIGENCE
Our basic model of negligence was developed in the previous sec-
tion. The legal standard of precaution, x(e), is defined implicitly
by (4). Should an accident occur, litigation will reveal the true
state-of-the-world, e. If a court finds that the firm's level of pre-
caution was less than x(e), then the firm will be liable for all acci-
dent costs; if greater than x(e), no liability will apply.
The firm does not know the state-of-the-world, e, when it chooses
x. The firm must choose an x based on an uncertain legal standard, x.
As discussed in the previous section, uncertainty in accident costs,
embodied in the random variable e, induces uncertainty in x. As
defined above, we let q(x) be the injurer's subjective probability
distribution around the legal standard, the level of precaution that
the firm must provide to avoid being held liable for accident costs.
We assume that q(x) is a continuous probability density with support
, s
8(-oo j0o). The probability that the injurer s level of precaution x
will end up being below the legal standard of care applied in the case
of an accident is thus given by
-10-
oo
R(x) = / q(x)dx. (7)
x
That is, R(x) is the probability when all is said and done, after the
court has passed judgment, that the injurer will pay damages
E [p(x,e )D(x,e) ] = A(x). We have already assumed that C(x) and A(x)
are convex. We now make the slightly stronger assumption that [C(x) +
A(x)R(x)] is strictly convex.
The essence of our model is presented in Figure 2. The expected
legal standard, which is defined to be the socially optimal level of
precaution, is where the marginal precaution costs just equal the nega-
tive of the marginal expected accident costs, as indicated in Eqn. 2.
With uncertainty, the injurer does not know x precisely. The
injurer 's uncertainty about the legal standard to which it will be
held accountable is embodied in q(x). If the injurer takes x amount
of precaution, then the probability it will be held liable is the area
under the density function from x to °°, R(x) , the cross-hatched area
in the figure. This is the probability that should an accident occur,
the firm will be found to be taking an inadequate amount of pre-
caution.
The injurer's objective function (in the presence of liability) is
defined by (5) except that L(x) is replaced by R(x):
TC(x) = E[C(x) + R(x)p(x,e)D(x,e)] = C(x) + A(x)R(x), (8)
which the firm attempts to minimize. TC(x) is strictly convex, by
assumption, and thus has a unique minimum. Let x be the level of
precaution that minimizes Eqn. (8). The first-order condition for the
minimization is
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TC'(x) = C'(x) + A'(x)R(x) - A(x)q(x) = 0, (9)
provided x is greater than zero. Eqn. 9 is basic to much of our
analysis and thus deserves some interpretation. The first term on
the right-hand side of Eqn. 9 is the marginal cost of providing a unit
of precaution. The second and third terms sum to the expected
marginal liability costs of a unit of precaution and consist of two
effects. The first of these terms [A'(x)R(x)] is the marginal
(reduction in) accident cost times the probability of being held
liable for the accident if the firm has taken precaution equal to x.
This term, which might be called the "injury effect," is negative
because A'(x) is negative and R(x) is always positive. The injury
effect represents a savings to the injurer from the application of
greater precaution because accident costs are reduced. But there is
also a savings from providing slightly higher precaution in that the
probability of being held liable is reduced. The monetary savings is
the product of the change in the probability of liability and total
expected accident costs. This savings is captured in the term
[-A(x)q(x)]. This term, which might be called the "liability effect,"
~ 9
is negative because both A(x) and q(x) are positive. Thus, the
marginal liability costs can be decomposed into an injury effect and a
liability effect, both of which are decreasing in precaution.
The question that arises is whether the level of precaution, x,
chosen by the firm to minimize its expected costs is greater than,
less than, or equal to the socially optimal level of precaution, x*
which is equal to E(x)? An evaluation of the relationship between x
-12-
and x* can be made by evaluating the sign of TC'(x*) in Eqn. 9. Since
by assumption x minimizes TC(x) and TC(x) is strictly convex, TC'(x) <
for x < x and TC'(x) > for x > x. Thus, if TC'(x*) < 0, then x* <
x; and if TC'(x*) > 0, then x* > x. Substituting Eqn. 2 into the
expression for TC'(x) (in Eqn. 9), noting that from society's point of
view there is no uncertainty, and rearranging the terras gives
TC'(x*) = C'(x*)[l - R(x*)] - A(x*)q(x*). (10)
Since C'(x) 2 ° DY assumption and R(x) _< 1, then C'(x*)[l - R(x*)] in
Eqn. (10) is nonnegative. Also, since by definition A(x) and q(x) are
greater than or equal to zero, the terra -A(x*)q(x*) is nonpositive.
Therefore, the sign of Eqn. (10) is indeterminate and the relationship
between x and x* cannot be discovered without knowing the magnitude of
the various terms. Any further evaluation of Eqn. 10 will require
further assumptions regarding the nature of the distribution q(x) and
the size of the marginal cost of precaution. First let us turn to
assumptions about the nature of the distribution q(x).
A. The Effect of the level of uncertainty about the legal standard
We are concerned here with uncertainty regarding x; i.e., the
variance of x distributed as q(x). We consider two cases, one where
there is a great deal of uncertainty with regard to the legal stan-
dard, and one where there is little uncertainty with regard to the
standard. An example of the first case is the great uncertainty
regarding the appropriate standard of care under a new technology,
e.g., genetic engineering. The level of scientific knowledge
-13-
regarding the potential for accidents and the extent of the damages
may be low, and it may therefore be difficult to determine in the
first instances of accidents what the socially optimal level of pre-
caution is testing, production, warnings, and disposal, is for geneti-
cally engineered output. An example of the second case, where there
is very little uncertainty about the appropriate legal standard, might
be the case for a well-recognized harm where the costs and benefits of
accident precaution are well known and legal precedent is well
established, e.g., automobile accidents.
We are concerned with the effect of uncertainty in q(x) on the
sign of TC'(x*) in (10). Before analyzing (10) we must be somewhat
more precise about what we mean by more or less uncertainty. The con-
10
ventional notion is that of second-order stochastic dominance. But
just because one distribution dominates another in this sense does not
assure us that the distribution function will be any different at x*,
which is critical in the present analysis. To facilitate our compara-
tive statics analysis, we will introduce a particular type of mean-
preserving spread on q(x):
q (x) = aq[a(x-x*) + x* ]
,
(11)
where (by assumption) the legal standard is distributed as q(x),
defined over the nonnegative reals, with expected value x*. It can
readily be seen that q.(x) = q(x). Furthermore, q is a well-behaved
1 a
density function for all values of a > 0, and random variables distri-
buted according to q and q have the same mean. As a decreases, the
-14-
spread of q increases, as shown in Figure 3 for a hypothetical
distribution. As a increases the probability mass becomes con-
centrated at the mean.
As uncertainty becomes larger, i.e., as ot becomes smaller, q(x*)
becomes smaller, and TC'(x*) in Eqn. 10 eventually becomes positive.
This implies that x is less than x*. As uncertainty becomes less,
i.e. , as a becomes larger, the probability mass becomes concentrated
at x* and TC'(x*) becomes negative. This implies that x is greater
than x*. We can now state our first result regarding the effect of
uncertainty on the use of negligence as a liability rule.
PROPOSITION 1. Assume that to the firm, the legal standard is
uncertain (distributed as q(x)) but has an expected value of x*,
with q(x*) > 0. If uncertainty regarding the legal standard (in
the sense of Eqn. 9) is sufficiently large (small), then the
injurer subject to a negligence rule will underprotect
(overprotect)
.
Proof : To prove that with sufficiently large uncertainty a firm will
underprotect, we need to show that there exists a more spread-out ver-
sion of q(x) such that TC'(x*) in Eqn. (10) becomes positive. Eqn. 10
can be rewritten using q from Eqn. (11) as
a
TC'(x*)=C , (x*)[l-R(x*)]-A(x*)q (x*)=C
'
(x*) [1-R(x*) ]-A(x*)aq(x*) (12)
a
Obviously, there exists an a > such that Eqn. (12) is positive
(since C'(x*) > 0). Conversely, since A(x*) > [because A'(x*) <
-15-
and A(x*) > 0] and q(x*) > 0, there exists an a > such that Eqn. 12
is negative.
Thus, even though the insurer's expected value of the legal
standard is equal to the social optimum, uncertainty is sufficient to
result in over- or underprotection.
B. The effect of the marginal cost of precaution at the social optimum
We now consider the effect of C'(x) on over- or underprotection,
holding q(x) constant. In Eqn. 10, if marginal costs of protection
are sufficiently large, then TC'(x*) can be driven positive. This
implies that x < x*—underprotection. By a similar argument it is
clear that as C'(x*) goes to zero, then TC'(x*) becomes negative,
implying that x > x*—overprotection.
PROPOSITION 2. If q(x*) > 0, then for a sufficiently small
(large) marginal cost of precaution at the social optimum, x*,
then the injurer will employ too much (little) precaution to
prevent an accident when faced with a negligence rule.
C. The effect of biased perceptions of the legal standard
In the previous section we focused on the effect of uncertainty
with respect to the legal standard on over- or underprotection. By
assumption, the mean of the distribution was the social optimum; what
we examined was the effect of changing the variance or spread of the
distribution. We now introduce a bias in the firm's perception of
x(e). We are now concerned less with the spread of the distribution
than with the extent to which the firm views the distribution of x as
-16-
biased to one side or the other of the social optimum. In particular
we consider the case where the bulk of the probability mass is either
1 o
to the left or right of x* (E[x(e)] £ x*). It is somewhat difficult
to argue why the firm alone should be biased in its perception of x*.
A possible explanation is evidentiary uncertainty where the firms
believe juries will consistently over- or underestimate accident costs
of precautionary costs (Cooter and Ulen, 1986).
Consider the family of distributions defined by
qCx) = 8q(8x) (13)
p
for 3 > 0. Obviously, q (x) = q(x). Further, if the mean and variance
2
of a random variable distributed as q are y and a , then the mean of a
2 2 2 11
random variable distributed as q is given by u Q = u/8 and a = a /6 •
R DP
Thus, as illustrated in Figure 4, for 8 < 1, the distribution is biased
to the right; and for 8 > 1, it is biased to the left. Note that for
some 8, q (x*) can be made arbitrarily small with R arbitrarily close
p 8
to or 1, depending on whether 8 is small or large.
The case where q is biased to the right might be the case of a
8
work-related harm in which it is difficult to show causality, e.g., an
increased incidence of lung disease as a result of a firm's negligence
two decades earlier. Conversely, suppose the firm significantly
underestimates the expected legal standard. Then R(x*) « 1. This
might be the case in emotionally charged accidents where juries may
have sympathy for victims.
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PROPOSITION 3. If the distribution q(x) is sufficiently biased
to the left (right) in the above sense, and q(x*) > 0, then the
injurer will underprotect (overprotect ) against an accident when
faced with a negligence rule.
Proof : To prove that if the distribution is sufficiently biased one
gets over- or underprotection, we parameterize q(x) as in Eqn. 12.
Eqn. 8 then becomes
TC*(x*) = C'(x*)[l - R (x*)] - A(x*)q Q (x*)
fc> p
= C'(x*)[l - R
fl
(x*)] - A(*)8q(Bx*). (14)
p
Since R(x) * as x * », clearly R.(x*) = R(8x*) * as S ». By
continuity of q(x), this implies that 6q(8x*) > as 3 * °°. Thus
there exists a sufficiently large 8 for which TC'(x*) in Eqn. (14)
becomes positive, implying that x < x*. Therefore, for uncertainty
sufficiently biased to the left, injurers will underprotect under a
negligence rule. Trivially, as 8 * 0, then TC'(x*) becomes negative:
if uncertainty is sufficiently biased to the right, injurers will
overprotect.
Note that as the distribution in Eqn. (13) shifts to the left
(right), the variance on the distribution decreases (increases). The
results of Proposition 1 suggest that if some other shift preserved
variance, then the results of Proposition 3 would still hold.
This proposition has a straightforward interpretation: if the
firm perceives the expected legal standard of precaution to be
sufficiently less than the social optimum, then the injurer will
-18-
underprotect ; an analogous interpretation would apply to overprotec-
tion. This is an intuitively reasonable result and is probably less
significant than our finding in Proposition 1.
IV. NEGLIGENCE AND EX ANTE REGULATION
We come now to the important public policy issue of whether effi-
ciency is better served by joint use of a negligence rule and ex ante
regulation (rather than negligence alone). We proceed by introducing
an ^x ante safety regulation into the model just developed.
The safety regulation specifies a minimally acceptable level of
precaution. There is no uncertainty with regard to the regulatory con-
straint; that is, the firm and the regulatory agency know the level of
the constraint and that it is enforced with certainty. Let the safety
regulation specify that precaution must be at least s. How does
information about the safety regulation influence the firm's percep-
tion about the (uncertain) legal standard of care? The firm knows
that the legal standard of precaution cannot be less than s. But the
firm may also perceive the legal standard to be significantly greater
than s. This seems most closely to approximate the prevailing rela-
tionship between jjx ante and ex post regulation where they are jointly
used. For example, no court today accepts compliance with a regula-
tory agency standard as a complete defense against a complaint of
negligence.
We first examine the impact from introducing the safety regulation
on the injurer's level of precaution. We represent the introduction
of ex ante regulation by changing the injurer's distribution around
-19-
the legal standard of precaution. With a safety regulation, s, the
injurer will not consider precaution below s. In effect, the firm's
probability distribution on the legal standard is truncated at s. By
assumption, there is zero probability that the legal standard will be
below s. There are a number of assumptions that could be made about
the firm's new truncated subjective distribution on the legal stan-
dard, cl(x). And the reader should note that our remaining results
hinge on the relationship between q(x) and q_(x). We make the simplest
assumption, that ^(x) has a conditional distribution
qjx) = q(x | x > s). (15)
Thus, we can write the conditional probability R_(x) that the injurer
will pay damages if its level of precaution is x as
R(x)=f^. (16)
The objective function of the injurer who is subject to both a safety
regulation and negligence liability becomes
min TC(x) = C(x) + A(x)R(x) (17)
x
Let x be the level of precaution that satisfies this minimization
problem. Then x can be viewed as a function of s, x(s). For a given
s, the first-order condition for x can be written as
a ^
TC'(x) = R(s)C'(x) + A'(x)R(x) - A(x)q(x) = 0, (18)
where x is understood to mean x(s).
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The question that needs to be addressed is how the insurer's
choice of x changes with a change of the ex ante safety regulation s;
i.e. , what is the sign of dx/ds? The answer to this question requires
the total differentiation of the first-order conditions given in (18).
The result of this total differentiation, upon rearrangement of terms,
is
d£
=
q(s)C'(x)
(19)
ds R(s)C"(x) + A"(x)R(x) - 2A»(x)q(x) - A(x)q'(x)'
By assumption, C(x) + A(x)R(x) is convex. Thus, the denominator of
(19) is positive. The numerator is also positive, which implies that
dx/ds is greater than zero. Thus, increasing the minimally acceptable
safety regulation has the effect of increasing the precaution taken.
The above result would imply that if x < x* (i.e., x(0) < x*)
prior to the imposition of the ex ante regulation, then the introduc-
tion of the regulation will promote efficiency. If, on the contrary,
x(0) > x*, then the ex ante regulation will exacerbate the ineffi-
ciency that exists with the negligence rule.
PROPOSITION 4. Imposition of an ex ante regulation, given the
existence of a negligence rule, will promote efficiency if the
injurer would be under-protective regarding an accident without
ex ante regulation and will exacerbate inefficiency if the injurer
would employ too high a level of precaution without ex ante regu-
lation.
-21-
This proposition may now be related to the conclusions of the pre-
vious section regarding the insurer's likely response to a negligence
rule with uncertain enforcement of the legal standard. Recall that
Propositions 1 through 3 established that injurers, when faced with
only a negligence rule, may choose suboptimal precaution when
(1) uncertainty about the legal standard is sufficiently large;
(2) the marginal cost of precaution at x* is large; or
(3) the distribution about the legal standard is sufficiently
biased to the left of x*.
It follows that when any of these conditions holds, injurers can
be induced to increase their level of precaution by establishing a
minimum safety regulation, s. Additionally, it follows from our dis-
cussion that because dx/ds is always positive, the imposition of an
ex ante minimum level of precaution in circumstances other than those
noted above will cause injurers to take too much precaution.
Given that the introduction of an ex_ ante safety regulation can
reduce inefficiencies associated with the use of liability alone, the
obvious next question is what level of the ex ante regulation, s*,
will induce firms to choose x(s) = x*? From Proposition 4, we know
that s* = if and only if x(0)
_> x*. Furthermore, if x(0) < x*, then
s* > will promote efficiency. The question now is, what level of s
will make x = x*? The answer can be found by substituting x* for x in
Eqn. 18 and solving for s*. Stopping short of actually solving Eqn.
18 for s*, we can rewrite it, using Eqn. 2, as
C'(x*)[R(s*) - R(x*)] - A(x*)q(x*) = 0. (20)
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For this to hold, the bracketed terra must be non-negative. This
implies that the optimum level of the ^x ante regulation is less than
14
or equal to the optimal level of precaution, i.e., s*
_< x*.
Furthermore, generally s* < x*. Consider the implications of s* = x*.
In this case R(x*) = R(s*), which implies, using Eqn. (20), that the
probability density at the social optimum (q(x*)) must equal zero
(because A(x*) > 0). In other words, the only way s* can equal x* is
if there is no chance that the legal standard will be at x*. That is
unlikely.
PROPOSITION 5. The optimum level of an ex ante safety regulation,
s*, given that a negligence rule exists, will be less than the
socially optimal level of precaution, x*, provided q(x*) > 0. If
q(x*) = 0, then s* = x* is optimal.
The implication of this result is that where optimal precaution
calls for the joint use of ex ante regulation and a negligence rule,
the optimal e_x ante regulatory constraint should be set below the
socially optimal level of care unless there is no uncertainty concern-
ing the legal standard of care.
This result is illustrated in Figure 5 for two cases. Case I is
the situation where negligence on its own over-provides precaution,
+
x . An ex ante regulation cannot increase efficiency. In fact, for
any s > in case I, the level of precaution, x,(s), increases and
deviates even further from the social optimum. Case II involves
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under-provision of precaution when the firm is subject only to liabi-
lity regulation, x . We see in both cases that as the ex ante regula-
tion is raised, precaution increases. In Case II, the optimal ex ante
regulation is where s* results in precaution of x*. Also shown in the
figure is what we might call the "conventional wisdom" along the
kinked line: liability alone induces optimal behavior for s < x*; as
soon as s reaches x*, then the ex ante regulation becomes binding and
precaution is provided at level s.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The propositions presented above have profound implications with
regard to the conditions where ex_ ante regulation alone or both
ex ante regulations and ^x post liability rules should be used jointly
in a wide range of public policies for dealing with external costs.
We introduced uncertainty into a defendant's assessment of the legal
standard of care and deduced the consequences of this uncertainty on
the defendant's choice of precaution under a negligence rule.
Propositions 1 through 3 indicate the effect of uncertainty about
the legal standard of care and the injurer's marginal cost of pre-
caution on under- or overprecaution. We next demonstrated that the
introduction of an _ex ante constraint specifying a minimally accept-
able level of precaution (a safety regulation) will always cause the
injurer to increase precautionary levels. We concluded that the joint
use of j^x ante and ^x post regulation will enhance efficiency under
the following conditions: if there is great uncertainty in the deter-
mination of the legal standard of care; or if the distribution is
-24-
highly biased tp the left of the socially optimal level of care; if
the insurer's marginal cost of precaution is large at the social
optimum. Otherwise, ex ante and ex post regulation should be used
separately.
We used our model to show the relationship between the optimal
ex ante constraint and the socially optimal level of care. Proposition
5 clearly indicates that if it is efficient to use both policies, then
the level of the ^x ante regulation should not be set at the social
optimum but rather at a lower level. That proposition might further
be taken to indicate that ex ante regulations should be used alone
when the probability of a successful suit against the injurer is zero.
This might be the case when there is a great deal of uncertainty asso-
ciated with a harm, as might occur when the harm is so new that those
it affects and the consequences of the harm are unclear but suspected
of being catastrophic, or when the level of accident costs borne out
by the injured party is so small that he or she might not even
recognize it, even though many individuals are affected.
Further implications for the optimal mix of regulatory policies
arise from a comparison of the assumptions of Propositions 1 through 4
with actual circumstances. This comparison may reveal both positive
and normative insights. For example, it might be possible, using the
model discussed here, to explain why new harms—e.g., the escape of
toxins into the environment—are typically regulated through ^x ante
command and control policies, while harms arising from more familiar
sources—e.g., automobiles—are typically regulated by exposing the
injurer to ^x post liability.
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There are several refinements to the model that seem appropriate.
First, our model includes only the injurer's costs of avoiding the
harm. A complete analysis would include an explicit treatment of the
victim's precautionary behavior under uncertainty. Second, a com-
parison of the administrative costs of the tort liability system and
of the ex ante system should be made. Third, uncertainty surrounding
the legal standard could be further broken down into its different
components—e.g., evidentiary uncertainty, uncertainty regarding the
technology of precaution, uncertainty regarding the level of accident
costs, and uncertainty about the victim's willingness to bring a tort
action—in order to allow the examination of the conditions under
which alternative jix post liability rules or a different mix of ex
ante and ^x post regulation might be efficient. Fourth, the possibi-
lity of bankruptcy could be introduced. Finally uncertainty regarding
the ex ante regulation could be introduced into the model. We have
assumed that there is no error in the determination or enforcement of
the ex ante standard. To the extent that such uncertainty exists,
then the case for complementary use of ex ante and ex. post regulation
becomes more complex. While it is clear that such uncertainty would
not affect our prohibition of the use of ex ante regulation when
injurers tend to oversupply precaution due to uncertainty regarding
the enforcement of the ex post liability rule, it should affect the
level of regulation when injurers undersupply precaution. It could be
argued that if regulators have enough information to set a lower
bound on precaution ^x ante
,
then the liability system should also
have enough information to set the same lower bounds. But this reform
-26-
cannot be affected within the tort liability system as it presently
exists. It can only be achieved by supplementing exposure to tort
liability with exposure to ex ante regulation.
-27-
FOOTNOTES
Brown (1973) and Diamond (1974) were among the first to mathe-
matically articulate Calabresi's (1970) theories of liability as a
means of controlling externalities.
2
An exception is the recent work of Shavell (1984a, b) which is
discussed in more detail later in this paper.
3
The classic comparison of the efficiency aspects of these alter-
nate methods of minimizing this type of externality is given by
Ellikson (1973).
4
Many authors (e.g., Diamond, 1974; Brown, 1973; Cooter et al,
1979) explicitly consider the level of precaution taken by the poten-
tial injured party. While this is realistic and leads to richer
conclusions in many analyses, it is tangential to the purposes of
this paper which is why we assume the potential injured party acts
optimally.
We avoid the complications of contributory negligence by assuming
that potential victims are taking the socially optimal amount of pre-
caution.
Diamond (1974) views this uncertainty from a somewhat different
perspective. He assumes the firm knows the legal standard of care
with certainty but the firm is uncertain about how its precautionary
measures translate into safety levels and it is these safety levels
that are measured by the court. However, the effect is the same: for
a given level of precaution the firm is uncertain as to whether he is
above or below the legal standard. Cooter and Ulen (1986) examine
evidentiary uncertainty, or uncertainty in exactly how a court will
interpret evidence in deciding whether the firm's level of precaution
was above or below the "legal standard."
Craswell and Calfee (1986) do prove that for a legal standard
symmetrically distributed about x*, small levels of uncertainty lead
to over-supply of precaution, provided density is concentrated at x*
for low levels of uncertainty.
8
Alternatively, one could argue that the support should be [0,<=°J.
9 ~ ~
The negative sign in front of the term [A(x)q(x)] is due to the
fact that R'(x) -q(x).
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Let X and Y be two random variables with cumulative distribution
functions G and F, respectively. Second-order stochastic dominance
states that X is more uncertain than Y if
t
/ [G(s) - F(s)]ds > for all t.
—00
This includes the case of a mean-preserving spread (Lippman and
McCall, 1981).
This result for overprotection was proved, for the special case
of symmetric distributions, by Craswell and Calfee (1986).
12
An alternative explanation of this result can be made with refer-
ence to Equation 9 and Figure 3. The last two terras of Equation 9,
the marginal liability costs, are the savings from increased precau-
tion. Equation 9 can be rewritten as
C'(x) = -A'(x)R(x) + A(x)q(x)
An increase (decrease) in the insurer's uncertainty at a point x, as
shown in Figure 3, decreases (increases) the right-hand-side of this
equation. This comes about because both R(x) and q(x) become smaller
(larger) as uncertainty increases (decreases). At the equilibrium
this implies that a lower (higher) level of precaution is taken by the
injurer.
13
This is a generalization and extension of the case considered by
Craswell and Calfee (1986) of the whole distribution shifting to the
right or left, although our results support their conjectures.
14
In (20), the term C'(x*) is positive as is the term A(x*), given
our earlier definitions of these functions. In order for Equation 20
to equal zero, R(s*) (the probability that s* is less than the ex post
standard) must be greater than that same probability at x*. This
relationship between R(s*) and R(x*) can only be true if s* < x*.
-29-
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